Multi-hop ad hoc networks are susceptible to selfish misbehavior such as traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Selfish nodes launching such attacks acquire unduly high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. TRAs are easy to execute, impossible to prevent, difficult to detect, and detrimental to the QoS of non-selfish nodes. In this paper we adopt a game-theoretic approach to analyze TRAs in multi-hop ad hoc networks. We present a formal model of opportunistic plausible TRAs and the corresponding one-shot non-cooperative game. Using a heuristic rank-based payoff function, we propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy that both selfish and non-selfish nodes are free to use, and that allows non-selfish nodes to respond in kind to TRAs. We analyze quasi-equilibria of the arising multistage game and verify via simulation that it often coincides with a Nash equilibrium at which nodes are restrained from executing harmful TRAs, whereas harmless TRAs are permitted. Finally, we determine whether boundedly rational nodes are likely to follow alternative multistage behavior rather than the proposed multistage strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-hop ad hoc networks rely on the mutual cooperation of stations to ensure correct network operation. This is best exemplified by the forwarding of each other's traffic, which entails certain costs: the energy spent on the transmission of transit packets and the decreasing of channel bandwidth available for source (i.e., locally generated) packets. The requirement of cooperation makes ad hoc networks susceptible to various kinds of attacks; particularly harmful are those performed by selfish insiders, i.e., stations that have already been authenticated (and are a legitimate part of the network) and that abuse network mechanisms to achieve an undue increase of the quality of service (QoS). E.g., by disseminating false routing advertisements, a node may prevent establishing paths that traverse it and thus avoid forwarding transit traffic. This necessitates secure routing protocols [1] , intrusion detection systems [2] , or trust management frameworks [3] . However, a more subtle method, referred to as the traffic remapping attack (TRA) [4] , can be used to bring an attacker better QoS at a low execution cost and a low risk of detection. A node performing a TRA falsely assigns traffic to classes: either source packets are assigned higher priority or transit packets are assigned lower priority (or both).
While TRAs are applicable to any network with class-based traffic differentiation, in ad hoc networks using IEEE 802.11 they rely on the enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) function. EDCA defines four access categories (ACs), each with its own set of medium access parameters to determine the probability and duration of channel access. Packets are mapped to ACs based on the Distributed Services Code Point (DSCP) set in their IP header, which in turn is based on the traffic's Class of Service (CoS) [5] . The CoS-to-DSCP mapping is done according to administrator policies, while the DSCP-to-AC mapping is implemented by network-layer packet mangling software. Thus, software such as Linux iptables is enough to execute a TRA through a false DSCP-to-AC mapping. This is in contrast to other selfish attacks, such as medium access parameter modification, which require tampering with the wireless card drivers. Furthermore, TRAs are difficult to detect: determining if the monitored higher-layer traffic matches its class designation requires deep packet inspection [6] .
So far, TRAs have mostly been studied in single-hop (ad hoc or infrastructure-based) wireless networks, where they were observed to drastically reduce the throughput of nonselfish nodes [6] . In multi-hop settings such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), the threat posed by TRAs is aggravated by their multi-hop impact: once assigned false priority, a packet retains its QoS designation further down the path to the destination. Additionally, a selfish node can both promote its source traffic and demote transit traffic [7] . An introductory study of the impact of TRAs and suitable countermeasures for multi-hop wireless settings can be found in [4] . In this paper, we perform a systematic analysis using a game-theoretic approach and providing the following contributions: 1) we discuss related work in the area of selfish attacks in multi-hop wireless networks (Section II), 2) from a formal model of quasi-static traffic patterns in an IEEE 802.11 EDCA-based multi-hop network (Section III), we derive a formal model of opportunistic TRAs (Section IV), 3) next, in Section V we present the results of a heuristic rank-type end-to-end performance metric to quantify the cost of TRAs both for attacker and non-attacker nodes, and verify this model using simulations and alternative heuristics, 4) using the cost metric as a payoff function, in Section VI we formally define and characterize a noncooperative one-shot TRA game in which both selfish and nonselfish nodes are free to launch TRAs, hence the latter may defend themselves against TRAs by responding in kind, 5) we argue that MANET nodes are likely to exhibit bounded rationality [8] , i.e., limited complexity, perseverance, and foresight; for such nodes in Section VII we propose a multistage TRA strategy and in Section VIII we verify experimentally that it reaches a form of equilibrium where the set of attacker nodes stabilizes, 6) we also verify that the multistage play most often ends up at, or close to, a Nash equilibrium of the single-stage TRA game, whereupon both attacker and non-attacker nodes typically benefit from TRAs, 7) finally, in Section IX we analyze a TRA metagame to determine whether boundedly rational nodes are likely to follow simple alternative multistage behavior (namely, sticking to the initial attacker/non-atacker behavior) rather than our proposed multistage TRA strategy. Section X concludes the paper and outlines some directions of future work. This paper is an extension of our previous conference paper [9] . The key novel parts are related to points 1), 3), and 7) above.
II. RELATED WORK
Selfish attacks in multi-hop ad hoc networks have mostly been studied at the network layer. The main attack under consideration has been packet dropping, also referred to as forwarding/relaying misbehavior. This attack can be considered as launched either on all packets (full dropping) or only on selected packets (partial dropping). In the latter case the dropping can be either probabilistic or deterministic (e.g., it may specifically target some packet types such as routing control packets).
The packet dropping attack has been widely analyzed and various countermeasures have been proposed. Due to node autonomy and lack of any administrative control only "soft" solutions are possible. Some proposals involve micropayment (credit) schemes, where a virtual currency is earned for performing relaying services and next used to buy similar services [10] . Others have focused on the problem of explicitly identifying attackers. This can be done passively, e.g., through a watchdog mechanism where nodes promiscuously listen to the channel and observe offending behavior [11] , or actively, e.g., by using additional end-to-end acknowledgment packets to determine which paths do not contain packet dropping attackers [12] . Attacker identification can be enhanced through reputation-based schemes where a node calculates reputation scores of neighbor nodes derived from first-hand (watchdogbased) experience, and possibly also reputation scores of more distant nodes from recommendations disseminated by their neighbors. Nodes with a low reputation score are identified as attackers [13] .
The main response to routing layer attacks has been of a denial-of-service nature, i.e., refusing to forward packets originating from attackers. Such an approach gives rise to a number of game-theoretic analyses of the underlying forwarding game. Various strategies (such as tit-for-tat) have been considered for enforcement of honest packet forwarding [14] . A complementary response is that of avoiding paths containing attackers, i.e., routing traffic around them. However, this is in fact beneficial to attackers, who spend less energy as they are offered less transit traffic [15] .
At the MAC layer most attacks have found the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF) [16] an easy target. It has been shown in numerous studies that performing a backoff attack, i.e., changing the transmission deferment parameters (such as idle carrier sensing or backoff times) yields the attacker a considerable increase in throughput and access delays at the cost of honest nodes [17] , [18] . This type of attack has been extensively studied, though mostly in a singlehop setting which is not surprising given the single-hop nature of the MAC layer.
TRAs should also be classified as MAC layer attacks. Despite being executed at the IP layer (through modifying packet headers), they rely on the underlying packet classification and category prioritization at the MAC layer. Local-scope TRAs were considered in [6] . However, multi-hop settings can also be vulnerable -an overview of attacks in IEEE 802.11s mesh networks can be found in [19] .
From a detection viewpoint, TRAs are more challenging in multi-hop settings than in single-hop ones, since it is not always clear how local-scope manipulation of per-traffic class handling translates into end-to-end per-flow or perpacket symptoms. In addition, MAC-layer attacks such as TRAs consist in aggressive competition for a limited resource (the radio channel), bringing more benefit to the attacker and more harm to the honest nodes than do routing-layer attacks, where the competition aspect is less pronounced. Finally, an advantage of a single-hop setting is that when a traffic remapping attacker has been identified, it can be easily punished by neighbor honest nodes via responding in kind, e.g., increased transmission rate or jamming [20] , which is impossible against routing-layer attacks. However, in a multi-hop setting such punishment of TRAs is questionable. We conclude that studies of selfish attacks performed at the MAC layer, such as TRAs, in multi-hop networks leave many insights to be gained.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Let G = N, L be a directed graph representing the current (quasi-static) MANET hearability topology, where N is the set of nodes, L ⊂ N × N , and (i, j) ∈ L iff i = j and j is in the hearability range of i. By N * we denote the set of all directed acyclic routes in G (i.e., sequences of nodes such that for each two consecutive nodes i and j, (i, j) ∈ L).
Let R ⊆ N * be the set of end-to-end routes in G as determined by the routing algorithm in use. Each r ∈ R is represented as a sequence (s r , . . . , d r ) of involved nodes, where s r and d r are source and destination nodes. We adopt the following notation for routes: write i ∈ r if r involves node i; for i, j ∈ r write i < r j (i ≤ r j) if i precedes (precedes or coincides with) j on r; for i ∈ r \ {d r } denote by succ r,i the immediate successor of i on r, and for i ∈ r \ {s r } define pred r,i as the immediate predecessor of i on r (pred r,sr is defined as s r ). Let P r,i = {j|j ≤ r i} be the set of nodes that precede or coincide with i on r. 1 Further assume that MANET traffic is composed of endto-end (e2e-)flows, each of which is a collection of packets of the same class ∈ CoS and moving along the same route. The corresponding MAC-layer frames are assigned ACs, which they carry in the AC fields contained in their headers, and handled accordingly by EDCA. Let AC be the set of distinguished ACs. For ease of presentation we restrict the used ACs to VO (assigned to voice traffic) and BE (assigned to best-effort traffic), i.e., AC = {V O, BE}, with VO enjoying (statistical) priority over BE at the MAC layer.
Since packet mangling software in fact amounts to a CoSto-AC mapping, one can define a function mang : CoS → AC such that mang(class) is the AC that the class of service class ∈ CoS should map to. Then, an e2e-flow of this class of service is represented as (r, ac), where r ∈ R is its route and ac = mang(class) ∈ AC is its intrinsic AC as returned at s r . Let F ⊆ R × AC be the (quasi-static) set of e2eflows offered by MANET users. Without loss of generality we assume that at least one e2e-flow is offered at each node, i.e., {s r |(r, ac) ∈ F } = N .
We refer to hop (h-) flows as the granulation level at which traffic is recognized at a next-hop node. At a given i ∈ r, packets of e2e-flow (r, ac) transmitted by j = pred r,i , whose frame headers contain AC fields with hac ∈ AC, are recognized as an h-flow (j, r, hac) (in general, it may be that hac = ac, since the AC fields can be modified hop-by-hop). For completeness, assume that e2e-flow (r, ac) is recognized at s r as (s r , r, ac). Let H ⊆ N × R × AC be the set of recognizable h-flows.
Autonomous operation of node i is modeled as map i : H → AC. For an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac) recognized at node i, where j = pred r,i and i ∈ r\{s r , d r }, map i (j, r, hac) is the new AC field transmitted by i further along r.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
A traffic remapping attack (TRA) that a node i ∈ r launches upon an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac), where j = pred r,i and i ∈ r \ {d r }, consists in configuring map i (j, r, hac) = hac. Such a definition captures the fact that the setting of AC fields under a TRA is both perfectly legal (in that the use of map j is feasible) and ill-willed (inconsistent with mang). In light of this, behavior of node i with respect to h-flow (j, r, hac) can be classified as
Nodes that exhibit TRA behavior will be called attackers. Each attacker is assumed to be opportunistic, i.e., launch a TRA + or a TRA − upon all hflows it recognizes, subject to the plausibility constraints, and plausible in that it never downgrades own source traffic or upgrades transit traffic, i.e., map i (j, r, hac) = hac if (hac = V O and i = s r ) or (hac = BE and i = s r ). Let A denote the set of attackers (A ⊆ N ); the case A = ∅ will be referred to as all-neutral.
Note that with respect to a given e2e-flow (r, ac), a plausible opportunistic attacker i does not modify any AC fields when i ∈ r or i = d r (in the latter case i will behave neutrally), or when ac = BE and i = s r , or, finally, when ac = V O and i = s r and i recognizes the e2e-flow as (j, r, BE), where j = pred r,i (i.e., when a TRA − has been launched by one of the nodes preceding i on r). We consider an example 10-node MANET with G represented as a hearability topology (node incidence matrix) as visualized in Fig. 1 . Table I illustrates per-flow perception of TRAs for a given set A = {2, 3, 5, 8}. Routes of e2e-flows were selected with uniformly distributed hop-lengths 2 . . . 5 and so that each node is a source of one e2e-flow, half of the flows being VO (we will use this traffic pattern throughout the remainder of the paper). For each e2e-flow it is indicated what TRAs have been experienced and at which node.
The following can be observed in Table I regarding the selected e2e-flows:
• e2e-flows #3 and #5 with ac = V O have an attacker source, which, however, does not launch a TRA − due to the plausibility constraints, • likewise, e2e-flow #3 has an attacker destination, which behaves neutrally due to the plausibility constraints, • for the same reason, e2e-flows #3 and #10 with ac = BE are not attacked at their attacker destinations, e2e-flow #4 is not attacked at an attacker transit node 3, which could only launch a TRA + , and e2e-flow #1 is not attacked at its attacker source (node 1), • e2e-flow #1 with ac = V O encounters two attacker transit nodes, of which the first launches a TRA − , hence the second no longer has to, • e2e-flows #2 and #8 experience a combination of a TRA + at their source nodes a TRA − at node 5; this is the maximum number of attacks an e2e-flow can experience. Note that if all the nodes were opportunistic attackers (A = N ) then all e2e-flows with |r| > 2 would be recognized at destination as BE h-flows.
V. ASSESSING TRA PERFORMANCE
In order to assess the performance of TRAs, we have developed a rank-based model as described in [9] . Each h-flow is assigned a rank dependent on the number and priorities of hflows it has to compete with for the radio channel. The h-flow ranks along a given route are then combined into a per-flow cost metric that reflects the respective e2e-flow's throughput and end-to-end delay. Finally, for all flows originating at a node, the per-flow costs are aggregated into a node cost.
Based on this model and for the above examples, under the flow configuration of Table I, Table II shows the qualitative impact of TRAs launched by A = {1, 3, 8, 9}, as compared to the all-neutral case. The status of an attacker (neutral node) whose cost has increased is lose (mind), otherwise it is don't lose (don't mind). don't mind don't lose 6
don't mind don't lose 7
don't mind lose 8
don't lose don't lose 9
don't lose don't lose 10 mind lose
One sees that, surprisingly, TRA behavior can both be harmful to an attacker and be harmless (even beneficial) to a node staying neutral. The reason is that from the viewpoint of an e2e-flow, TRAs may in various ways affect the number of competing VO h-flows -either decrease it (due to TRA − ) or increase it (reflecting stronger intra-path interference due to TRA + ).
To validate the correctness of the abovementioned network and attack models, we implemented the network topology presented in Fig. 1 and its corresponding traffic flow configuration (Table I) in the ns-3.28 simulator. The following simulation settings were used: connectivity between nodes was based on a predefined hearability matrix reflecting Fig. 1 (i.e., the propagation loss was fixed for each pair of nodes); the channel did not introduce errors; 802.11a was used as the PHY layer while 802.11e (EDCA) -at the MAC layer; static routing was configured. Each flow was based on a constant bit-rate UDP traffic generator (with 1500 B packets) with an equal offered load set to saturate the network. was repeated five times (further repetitions did not impact the results).
By way of validation, we assess congruity, defined as the proportion of nodes whose status (mind, lose, don't mind, or don't lose) upon TRAs launched by a random attacker set agrees between the simulation and the rank-based model. Fig. 2 presents the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of congruity obtained after simulating 100 different attacker sets, producing the mean congruity of approximately 0.796. For comparison consider a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) heuristic, i.e., if the number of attackers in A exceeds (does not exceed) a threshold then all the attacker nodes' status is guessed as lose (don't lose) and the neutral nodes' as don't mind (mind). The corresponding CDFs depicted in Fig. 2 for thresholds varying from 0 to |N | produce mean values between 0.465 and 0.535, not far from guessing by a fair coin toss. As another baseline, an unrealistic "informed gambler", who knew an attacker (neutral) node's statistical chance of acquiring a lose (mind) status under a random attacker set, might guess the node's status for a given A by tossing an appropriately biased coin. Congruity would then be measured by the expected number of guesses that match the simulation. The corresponding CDF depicted in Fig. 2 produces a mean value of 0.699. We conclude that the rank-based model is too simplistic to be a perfect predictor of the impact of TRAs in saturated MANETs. Nonetheless, it is a good indicator thereof and we will subsequently use it to analyze the arising noncooperative TRA game.
VI. ONE-SHOT TRA GAME
In a noncooperative one-shot game that arises, the nodes are players, map i is node i's strategy, and cost is the (negative) payoff function. A strategy profile (map i , i ∈ N ) can be equivalently described as the set A ⊆ N of opportunistic attackers. A formal description of the game, of the form player set, strategy profile, payoff function , is therefore:
Some interesting strategy profiles are: ∅ (all-neutral, corresponding to no TRAs being launched), and N (corresponding to each node being an opportunistic attacker). In the latter, any e2e-flow (r, BE) experiences a TRA + at s r , whereas any e2e-flow (r, V O) with |r| > 2 experiences a TRA − at the first node in r \ {s r , d r }. To investigate the nature of the game in a small-size MANET, cost can be tabulated applying the model of [9] to all feasible strategy profiles.
An observation that necessitates subtler game-theoretic treatment is that, contrary to the intuition behind the rankbased model of [9] (whereby it is apparently beneficial to upgrade source traffic and to downgrade competing transit traffic), the TRA game is not a multiperson PD. Specifically, TRA does not dominate neutral behavior, as seen from the presence of lose nodes in the above examples. Neither is TRA necessarily harmful to neutral nodes, as seen from the presence of don't mind nodes. This is because of the complex interplay of MAC contention, EDCA prioritization and intraflow competition due to multi-hop forwarding in the presence of hidden nodes (where packet transmissions from one node compete with those from up-and downstream nodes one or two hops away). Moreover, A = ∅ may, but need not be Pareto superior to A = N ; in fact, for some traffic patterns, the reverse is true [9] .
An important characterization of a game is through its Nash equilibria (NE) [21] . For a set of attackers A ⊆ N and i ∈ N define
thenÂ is a weak (strict) NE if and only if ∀i ∈ N :
Numerical experiments show that the TRA game may possess multiple NE. An exhaustive search of the set 2 N for 100 random MANET topologies with |N | = 10 and uniformly distributed route lengths 2 . . . 5 reveals that among the 2 |N | feasible strategy profiles, typically up to 5% are NE, cf. the xcoordinates of the diamond-shape points in Fig. 5a . The vast majority of these NE are weak. Given the non-PD nature of the TRA game, one needs to establish conditions under which TRAs pose a real danger and so defense is necessary. For a moderate-size MANET, we are interested in the evolution of the strategy profile (attacker set) A over time under some model of rational play. In particular, we want to predict the strategy profile(s) that nodes will eventually arrive at. Note that while rational play is known to lead to an NE [22] , MANET nodes are better modeled as boundedly rational, i.e., exhibiting limited complexity, perseverance, and foresight. Such nodes can be reasonably expected to adopt a simple multistage attack strategy that leads to some form of equilibrium, cf. [6] , [8] .
VII. MULTISTAGE TRA GAME
Suppose the TRA game is played in stages k = 1, 2, . . ., and in each stage a node can set its behavior to either attack (i.e., become an opportunistic attacker) or neutral. Let A(k) ⊆ N be the set of attackers in stage k. Of interest is the evolution (in particular asymptotic behavior) of A(k), starting from any A(0) ⊆ N , under some multistage attack strategy that can 
be justified as rational in some sense. A possible heuristic multistage attack strategy with a rational trait is for a node to: 1) disallow a behavior change if the current cost is the smallest over a predefined number of recent stages (referred to as cost memory, m); the node is then called satisfied, 2) if a behavior change is allowed (node is currently dissatisfied), decide it with a probability that depends on the history of own play; the change from the current behavior is driven by the excess of past stages where the same behavior led to a cost increase over those where it did not. The above multistage strategy can be formalized simply by specifying how A(k) derives from A(k − 1). This is given by Algorithm 1, where ε π denotes a random event occurring with probability π, σ : R → [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function with lim x→−∞ σ(x) = 0 and lim x→+∞ σ(x) = 1, and the logical condition ϕ i (k) expresses node i's satisfaction in stage k: (the sigmoid function) and the rank-model parameters set as in [9] .
For a traffic pattern with each node a source of one e2eflow, Fig. 3 plots against k the following characteristics, averaged over 100 random MANET instances with |N | = 10 and uniformly distributed route hop-lengths 2 . . . 5, and 100 runs per instance with fixed A(0) = ∅:
• number of attackers, i.e., |A(k)|, • number of dissatisfied nodes, i.e., {i ∈ N : ¬ϕ i (k)}|. In randomly generated MANET instances, A(k) typically (in 97.3% of runs) converges over time to a "quasiequilibrium" A ∞ such that ∅ = A ∞ = N . 2 A ∞ may differ from run to run on account of the randomness inherent in Algorithm 1, and may also depend on A(0). However, averaged over multiple runs, |A ∞ | seems insensitive to A(0): similar plots were produced when A(0) was randomly chosen in successive runs. Moreover, cost i (A ∞ ) < cost i (A(0)) is observed for some or all i / ∈ A ∞ . This confirms that at a "quasi-equilibrium", TRAs can be harmless to neutral nodes.
Based on the plots one also conjectures that the convergence occurs regardless of scenario (albeit may be slow for large m), i.e., all the nodes eventually become satisfied. The intuitive explanation is that nodes whose costs have not increased recently do not leave the satisfied set, and the others are more likely to try different behavior and so to lower their costs in the near future (indeed, observed nodes' costs cease to increase from some stage on).
An interesting characterization of the observed A ∞ , reflecting the rationality of Algorithm 1, is that there are eventually very few nodes i for which cost i (A
, and which also fulfill the following:
∞ ) ≥ cost j (A ∞ ), i.e., node i is an attacker, but if had stayed neutral, would have decreased its cost without decreasing that of any other attacker (hence, without bolstering other attackers' satisfaction), 
∞ ) ≤ cost j (A ∞ ), i.e., node i is neutral, but if had attacked, would have decreased its cost without increasing that of any other neutral node (hence, without provoking neutral nodes' dissatisfaction, which might lead to more TRAs). In the simulations, the former type of node i was almost never observed, and the latter averaged around 6% of |N |.
The rank-based model of [9] is based on two scaling parameters, α and β. The former measures an h-flow's incentive to compete for the spectrum as a VO h-flow, the latter -an h-flow's reluctance to compete with VO h-flows. An analysis of the influence of these two parameters, shown in Fig. 4 , further corroborates the rationality of Algorithm 1. For a 10-node MANET instance with each node a source of one e2e-flow, they show near-asymptotic percentage of attackers, namely 100 × |A(100)|/|N | averaged over 100 runs with random A(0). Regardless whether α is fixed or grows in step with β, the near-asymptotic percentage of attackers remains approximately constant.
One can also judge the rationality of Algorithm 1 by "NE hits" (the percentage of runs where an NE is asymptotically arrived at) in relation to the proportion of NE among the 2 |N | feasible strategy profiles. If the former is distinctly larger than the latter, the NE reached by the multistage strategy is not "accidental", and the strategy can be said to be NE-seeking. To get a more comprehensive view, one can extend the notion of NE to δ-NE, where up to a fraction δ of the inequalities (3) are violated. The plot in Fig. 5a has been obtained for the same 100 random MANET instances as before, with δ = 0, 10%, and 20%. Each dot corresponds to a MANET instance with "NE hits" obtained from 100 runs with random A(0). The NE-seeking property is clearly visible.
A good characterization of the above multistage strategy is its effectiveness reflecting the ability to improve the perceived QoS over successive stages. Assuming that all legitimate QoS requirements are satisfied at the all-neutral strategy profile ∅, of interest is the average percentage of asymptotic beneficiary (don't mind or don't lose) nodes against the analogous average percentage for corresponding initial strategy profiles. If the former percentage is larger, the multistage strategy can be said to be asymptotically effective. The plot in Fig. 5b reflects the same 100 MANET instances, each producing a dot obtained by averaging over 100 runs with random A(0). Our multistage attack strategy turns out asymptotically effective in more than 70% of MANET instances. Hence, the asymptotic outcomes typically feature more beneficiary nodes than do the corresponding initial strategy profiles. One concludes that Algorithm 1 expresses selfish nodes' bounded rationality and yields non-selfish nodes an effective respond-in-kind defense against TRAs. The fact that not all the nodes end up as attackers, but all are satisfied with the costs, suggests that harmful TRAs are curbed in the first place, whereas harmless ones need not be. It also shows that, fortunately, responding in kind is not a punishment that leads to a spiral of "punishing the punishers" [23] .
IX. TRA METAGAME
While the presented multistage strategy has been demonstrated to foster equilibrium play in the TRA game (in that it has the NE-seeking property), it is also worth asking if this strategy is itself an equilibrium in any sense. In other words, given a plethora of feasible multistage behaviors, are boundedly rational nodes likely to follow Algorithm 1? To get some preliminary insight, we restrict the infinite space of possible multistage behaviors to a binary choice a node has to make at time 0: either use Algorithm 1 or trivially stick to the present attacker/neutral behavior. Though simplistic, such a view is intended to at least disqualify some trivial behaviors as potential competitors to our multistage strategy.
Define a TRA metagame induced by the TRA game so that N is the set of players each of which selects a multistage behavior, and the payoffs are equal to asymptotic cost values, assuming they exist. Consider the set A(0) ⊆ N of initial attackers, the remaining set N \A(0) being the initial neutrals. An initial attacker chooses either our multistage strategy given by Algorithm 1, in which case it is called a multistage strategist (MS) node, or sticks to the initial behavior, in which case it is called a persistent attacker (PA) node. Likewise, an initial neutral will be called either an MS or persistent neutral (PN) node. To further simplify the picture assume that all the initial attackers are of the same type, as are all the initial neutrals (e.g., all the initial attackers are PA and all the initial neutrals are MS). TRA metagame scenarios can thus be labeled "PA attackers vs. MS neutrals", "MS neutrals vs. MS attackers", etc.
As before, the effectiveness of a behavior can be judged by the asymptotic percentage of beneficiary (don't lose or don't mind) nodes of a given type with respect to the allneutral profile, i.e., nodes i ∈ N that after long enough play observe that cost i (A ∞ ) ≤ cost i (∅). (Hence, all beneficiary nodes fare no worse than in the ideal MANET free of TRAs, where all legitimate QoS requirements are assumed to be satisfied.) Based on a numerical study using a sample of 100 random instances of a 10-node MANET, Fig. 6 compares the effectiveness in various TRA metagame scenarios. Each MANET instance produces a dot through averaging over 100 runs of a TRA metagame scenario with random A(0). The location of the dot relative to the straight line y = x signals a preference for some behavior in that particular MANET instance; a general preference can be stated if a vast majority of dots are located on one side of y = x.
The following general preferences are visible in the TRA metagame:
• MS is preferred to PA for initial attackers against both MS initial neutrals ( Fig. 6a , with only 20% dots on the wrong side of y = x) and PN initial neutrals ( Fig. 6b , with 1% dots on the wrong side), • MS is preferred to PN for initial neutrals against both MS initial attackers ( Fig. 6c , with 14% dots on the wrong side) and PN initial attackers ( Fig. 6d , with 12% dots on the wrong side). A conceptual illustration of these preferences is provided in Fig. 7 . Thus in a 2 × 2 TRA metagame where initial attackers choose from {MS, PA} and initial neutrals choose from {MS, PN}, MS is the dominant behavior for all the players, making the behavior profile (MS, MS) a (highly compelling) dominance equilibrium.
X. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a formal model of TRAs in multi-hop ad hoc networks. This allowed us to rigorously define the arising TRA game and propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy. Through simulations we have shown that (a) it can serve as an effective respond-in-kind countermeasure to TRAs and (b) it is preferable to persistent attacker or neutral behavior. Further analysis of alternative boundedly rational strategies (e.g., reinforcement learning, trial-and-error, regret-based), as well as rigorous proofs of convergence are left for future research. Also, more work should aim to systematically prevent or curb only harmful TRAs, as was done in a singlehop setting [6] . Finally, analysis of the proposed strategy in realistic wireless networks should reveal the impact of transmission impairments, traffic volume and fluctuations, and end-to-end protocols such as TCP.
